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“[W]e cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular words
without also running a substantive risk of suppressing ideas in the process.”1
Introduction
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation2 is probably best known as the case concerning George
Carlin’s satiric monologue, “Filthy Words”, otherwise known as the “Seven Dirty
Words” bit. Of course, the more lasting effect of the decision is the legal principle that
indecent speech, while falling within the ambit of First Amendment protection, can be
regulated by the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC” or “Commission”).
However, the limited nature of the holding has sometimes been overlooked, especially
the caveats and qualifications sprinkled throughout both the majority and concurring
opinions.3 Given that much of the Supreme Court’s belief that its decision would not
unduly chill broadcasters’ speech depended on the narrowness of the holding, and the
Commission’s assurance of self-restraint in its enforcement,4 it is critically important to
examine the decision and subsequent FCC action under this lens. The limited nature of
the holding is particularly relevant today, given the Commission’s most recent and public
push to vigorously pursue broadcasters for airing what it views as indecent material.
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Part I of this article will provide some background of the Pacifica case and will look at
the various opinions penned by the Supreme Court with a particular focus on the
narrowness of each opinion. This section will also examine the FCC’s initial reaction to
the decision, including its indecency enforcement actions in the following years. Part II
will consider the atmosphere during the late 1980s that prompted the FCC’s reexamination of its indecency enforcement policy, resulting in a set of orders issued by the
FCC in April 1987.5 Through these orders, the Commission changed course and
instituted a more sweeping enforcement agenda, giving itself more power in the process.
Part II will also analyze the string of cases, popularly known as the ACT cases,6 decided
by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (“D.C. Circuit”),
which addressed the FCC’s expanded enforcement policy. Finally, Part III of this article
will look at the Commission’s enforcement tendencies after the April 1987 orders up to
the present, including an examination of the FCC’s 2001 Policy Statement, which
attempted to provide broadcasters with guidance on the indecency issue. Part III will
culminate in the recent whirlwind of activity, from the Golden Globe Awards decision
issued in March 2004, to the recent passage of “broadcast decency” bills in Congress.
Throughout, this article will consider whether the Commission has shown the restraint
the Supreme Court relied upon in Pacifica, and in the end, concludes it has not. By
failing to do so, the Commission continues to erode the limited nature of the original
holding and the First Amendment rights of broadcasters in the process.
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I. The Stage is Set - The Pacifica Decision
A. Background
A single FCC complaint gave birth to the Pacifica case.7 The complaint was filed against
a Pacifica-owned New York radio station for broadcasting comedian George Carlin’s 12minute monologue entitled “Filthy Words”.8 The monologue, recorded before a live
audience in a California theater, consisted of Carlin’s use of the following seven words
that he believed you couldn’t say on the public airwaves: shit, piss, fuck, cunt,
cocksucker, mother-fucker and tits.9 The overall tone of the monologue was satirical,
poking fun at the words themselves, and questioning why certain words are so offensive.
Pacifica described the monologue as an attempt by Carlin to explore society’s attitudes
towards the words.10

The Carlin material aired on October 30, 1973 at about 2:00 p.m.11 According to the
station, the broadcast was preceded by a warning that the program contained sensitive
language that might be regarded as offensive to some.12 John R. Douglas, a member of
Morality in Media filed a complaint with the FCC claiming he heard the broadcast while

7

Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 730.

8

Id.

9

Id. at 729 and app. at 751. A verbatim transcript of Carlin’s “Filthy Words” monologue can be found in an
appendix to the decision. Id. at 751-55.

10

Id. at 730.

11

Id. at 729.

12

Id. at 730.

3

driving with his young son, who was 15 years old.13 Mr. Douglas lived in Ft. Lauderdale,
Florida at the time of the broadcast and stated in the complaint that he was traveling in
New York with his son.14 There is some speculation that Mr. Douglas was not in the
broadcast audience that day due in part to the fact that he resided in Ft. Lauderdale and
because the complaint was filed six weeks after the material aired.15

On February 21, 1975, the Commission ruled in favor of Mr. Douglas’ complaint, but did
not issue a fine against Pacifica.16 The order held the FCC had the power to regulate
“indecent” broadcasting based on two statutes.17 The first statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1464,
prohibits the utterance of “obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio
communication,”18 and the second, 47 U.S.C. § 303(g), requires the Commission to
“encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest.”19

The Commission’s indecency finding rested on the assertion that when certain words
depict sexual and excretory activities in a patently offensive manner and are repeated
over and over at a time when children are undoubtedly in the audience, the language is
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indecent.20 While not advocating an outright ban on indecent material, the Commission
proposed treating indecent broadcasts as a “nuisance” that could be channeled and aired
only during certain hours.21

While the Commission ruled against Pacifica, not every commissioner was optimistic
about a court upholding the FCC finding of indecency. According to telephone
interviews conducted by Jeff Demas with Joseph Marino, the Commission’s chief legal
counsel during the Pacifica case, the FCC felt that Congress was forcing them to pursue
the complaint because Congress had been concerned with sexually explicit radio shows
for some time.22 The commissioners were aware that the case represented an aspect of
FCC regulation that had not yet been directly addressed by the courts: FCC regulation of
indecency as opposed to obscenity.23 The Commission did not expect a favorable ruling
from the Supreme Court on the matter,24 which may explain why it decided not to issue a
fine in the first place.

Pacifica could have been content to take the Commission’s wrist slap, but the station was
historically concerned with free speech issues25 and, therefore, appealed the
Commission’s order. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed the FCC’s order, in a 2 to 1
20
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decision.26 The majority judges split on the reasoning behind the reversal. One found
that the FCC order was an attempt at rulemaking on the indecency issue, and considered
the rule to be overbroad.27 The other concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 1464 was a narrow
statute intended only to cover obscene language or language not protected by the First
Amendment.28 The dissenting judge held that the only issue at hand was whether the
Commission could regulate the language as broadcast, and given such narrow focus, the
Commission had correctly decided that the daytime broadcast was indecent.29

B. Enter Stage Left - The Supreme Court Decision
After a denial by the D.C. Circuit for a rehearingen banc ,30 the Commission pursued the
case to the Supreme Court, which granted the Commission’s petition for certiorari.31 The
Court produced a fractured 5-4 decision in favor of the Commission. However, even the
majority opinion remained cautious in its approach to indecency regulation. This
decision has become the main legal rationale for allowing the FCC to regulate indecency.
Accordingly, it is important to note the narrow and limited scope of the opinion.

1. Majority Opinion
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Justice Stevens delivered the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist joined in full, and in which Justices Blackmun and Powell joined in part.32
The majority opinion first addressed whether the FCC order was an effort at formal
rulemaking or merely a decision based on the facts. According to the majority, the
question of future FCC actions under different circumstances was not addressed by the
FCC order, which was carefully confined to the monologue as broadcast.33 Therefore,
the Court treated the issue not as an attempt at rulemaking by the Commission, but
instead as a decision limited to the Carlin material as broadcast in the afternoon.34

This brief portion of the Pacifica opinion is significant. From the very outset, the
Supreme Court limited the holding to the facts of the case. In particular, the holding was
limited to a broadcast aired in the afternoon of a monologue that repeatedly used “vulgar
words” for “shock value”.35 In fact, Carlin used the “seven dirty words” a total of 108
times during his 12-minute monologue. None of the majority justices addressed the
implications of extending the FCC’s definition of indecency beyond the Carlin
monologue.
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The majority also considered Pacifica’s argument that the Commission’s definition of
indecency under 18 U.S.C. § 1464 was flawed. While the statute does not define
indecency, Pacifica argued that for material to be considered indecent, the material must
contain some “prurient interest,”36 a necessary requirement to a finding of obscenity.37
Pacifica based its argument on the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamling v. United
States,38 which considered the meaning of indecent in a statute forbidding the mailing of
“‘obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile’”39 material. The Court in Hamling
held that the statutory words had “many shades of meaning,”40 but when taken as a whole
the statute was clearly limited to prohibiting only material that could be considered
obscene. Pacifica argued that the same reasoning applied to the prohibition against
obscene, indecent, and profane broadcasts in 18 U.S.C. § 1464.

The majority rejected Pacifica’s argument on essentially two grounds. First, it noted that
while prurient interest is a requirement to an obscenity finding, “the normal definition of
‘indecent’ merely refers to nonconformance with accepted standards of morality.”41
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Additionally, the Court distinguished the Hamling case from the Pacifica situation,
reasoning that the history of the statute in Hamling was primarily concerned with the
prurient, while the Commission had long interpreted § 1464 to cover more than the
obscene. Thus, the majority held that “there is no basis for disagreeing with the
Commission’s conclusion that indecent language was used in this broadcast.”42

Pacifica also argued that the Commission’s order restricted speech protected by the First
Amendment because the Commission’s definition of indecency was overbroad.43 The
majority rejected this argument in part IV-A of its opinion, holding that its review in the
case was limitedto the particular broadcast in question, not a general rule regarding
indecency. Since the FCC order was “‘issued in a specific factual context,’”44 the Court
declined to consider whether the “medicine” prescribed by the FCC would result in some
broadcasters self-censorship of material protected by the First Amendment.45 Within this
discussion, the majority argued that while the Commission’s definition might lead
broadcasters to censor themselves, it would affect only a small area of speech which they
believed lied only at the periphery of First Amendment concern. 46 The majority’s
consideration of the speech’s value is what led to Justices Powell and Blackmun’s
concurring opinion, wherein they disagreed with the Court’s attempt to determine First
Amendment protection by placing a value system on the speech involved.
42
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With respect to Pacifica’s argument that the government could not prohibit the broadcast
because it was not obscene, the majority, in part IV-B of its opinion, couched the
question in terms of whether the First Amendment denies the government any power to
restrict public broadcast of indecent language under any circumstance.47 The majority
acknowledged that Carlin’s monologue was entitled to First Amendment protection, and
that the Commission’s objection to the monologue was based in part on its content.48
However, the majority noted that First Amendment protections are not absolute, listing
the established exceptions to protected speech, ranging from fighting words to
obscenity.49

Although indecent material generally did not fit within any of the unprotected categories
enumerated by the Court, the majority argued that “constitutional protection accorded to
a communication containing such patently offensive sexual and excretory language need
not be the same in every context.”50 Returning to its concern about the value of the
speech involved, the Court reasoned, quoting Chaplinsky,51 that certain utterances are not
an essential part of the exposition of ideas and are of such slight social value that the
47
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benefit from them are outweighed by social interest in order.52 In particular, the Court
noted that there was no reason to believe the Commission had sanctioned the Carlin
monologue for the content it contained, but instead for the words chosen, which the Court
reasoned offend for the same reason obscenity offends.53 Implicit in the Court’s
discussion was the theory that the speech here was of little value and that such factor
should be considered in its decision. Again, the concurring justices disagreed with this
portion of the majority opinion.

In the last portion of the majority opinion, part IV-C, the Court set out more specifically
its rationale for allowing the Commission’s action in this case. The majority maintained
that broadcasting as a medium had received limited First Amendment protection in the
past and provided two relevant reasons for such limitations in Pacifica. First, the
majority cited the “uniquely pervasive presence”54 broadcasting has in the lives of
Americans. Second, it reasoned that broadcasting is “uniquely accessible to
children….”55

Having pieced together its reasoning for allowing the Commission to regulate speech
otherwise protected by the First Amendment, the majority concluded by “emphasiz[ing]
the narrowness of [its] holding.”56 The majority went on to limit its holding stating “[w]e
52
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have not decided that an occasional expletive in either setting would justify any sanction
or, indeed, that this broadcast would justify a criminal prosecution. The Commission’s
decision rested entirely on a nuisance rationale under which context is all-important.”57

2. Concurring Opinion
As noted above, Justices Powell and Blackmun’s concurring opinion took issue with the
other three majority Justices regarding the relevance of the Carlin material’s value. The
majority had reasoned that the Carlin material was of less value and therefore could be
viewed as less deserving of First Amendment protection.58 The concurring Justices
argued the result of the case did not turn on whether Carlin’s monologue had value,
because that is a decision for each person to make.59

However, Justices Powell and Blackmun did agree that the language used would be
considered by most to be vulgar and offensive.60 Notably though, they specifically
limited the category of speech addressed by the Court in Pacifica, stating that the
language “was chosen specifically for this [vulgar and offensive] quality, and was
repeated over and over as a sort of verbal shock treatment. The Commission did not err
in characterizing this narrow category of language used here as ‘patently offensive’ to
most people regardless of age.”61
57
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Furthermore, Justices Powell and Blackmun relied heavily on the Commission’s
purported restraint in addressing the overbreadth issue, determining that there would be
no undue chilling effect on broadcasters’ speech in the future. Citing the Commission’s
own brief to the Court, they declared, “since the Commission may be expected to proceed
cautiously, as it has in the past…I do not foresee an undue ‘chilling’ effect on
broadcasters’ exercise of their rights.”62

As Justices Powell and Blackmun provided the deciding votes that tipped the Court to
uphold the Commission’s order, it is extremely important to recognize the limitations
their concurring opinion placed on the holding. In fact, there is some argument to be
made that on the overbreadth issue, the Court produced only a plurality opinion, as the
concurring Justices did not joint in parts IV-A and IV-B of the opinion, joining only in
part IV-C which set forth the rationales of pervasiveness of the medium and accessibility
to children as the basis for the ruling. In a plurality opinion, "the holding of the Court
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments
on the narrowest grounds."63 Arguably, the concurring opinion’s rationale for upholding
the Commission’s order in light of the overbreadth argument was narrower than the
majority’s opinion, relying on the Commission’s restraint and the fact that the language
was used over and over again as a sort of verbal shock treatment. This particular
limitation has been eviscerated by the Commission’s recent decision in the Golden Globe
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Awards order, discussed later. In addition, the Commission’s restraint since Pacifica in
pursuing indecency complaints appears to sway back and forth based on the political and
social climate of the time, along with the pressure it receives from various advocacy
groups and Congress. Based on the limitations expressed in the concurring opinion, such
actions by the Commission cannot be the restraint Justices Powell and Blackmun had in
mind.

3. Dissenting Opinions
While the majority and concurring opinions certainly limited the Pacifica holding, there
are still important arguments worth noting in the two dissenting opinions. The first
dissent, authored by Justice Stewart, and joined by Justices Brennan, White and Marshall,
claimed that the Court unnecessarily addressed a constitutional issue. According to
Justice Stewart, the construction of the word “indecent” in 18 U.S.C. § 1464 to include
more than obscenity, while a plausible construction, was not a compelled construction.64
Stewart argued that Supreme Court practice is to avoid constitutional confrontation where
there is serious doubt as to the statute’s constitutionality.65 Since the Court in Hamling
construed the word indecent to have the same meaning as obscene, and the statutory
context of the Hamling statute was closely related to 18 U.S.C. § 1464, the word indecent
should properly be read as meaning no more than obscene.66 Because Carlin’s
monologue was not obscene, the Commission did not have the authority to ban it.
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Justices Brennan and Marshall’s dissent confronted the majority’s opinion on the
constitutional issues raised. While agreeing with Justice Stewart that the Court should
not have reached the constitutional issues, Justice Brennan explained that “while I
would…normally refrain from expressing my views on any constitutional issues
implicated in this case…I find the Court’s misapplication of fundamental First
Amendment principles so patent, and its attempt to impose its notions of propriety on the
whole of the American people so misguided, that I am unable to remain silent.”67

Justice Brennan argued that the Court committed two errors. First, it misconstrued the
nature of privacy interests in an individual’s home when the individual has voluntarily
chosen to keep a radio or television in the home.68 Second, the Court did not consider the
constitutionally protected interests of those wishing to transmit and receive broadcasts
which the Court or the Commission may find offensive.69

On the first account, Justice Brennan noted that an individual’s actions in turning on a
radio and listening to public airwaves do not implicate fundamental privacy issues. By
turning on the radio, Justice Brennan reasoned that the listener chose to participate in a
sort of public discourse carried over the public airwaves.70 According to Justice Brennan,
“[w]hatever the minimal discomfort suffered by a listener who inadvertently tunes into a
67
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program he finds offensive during the brief interval before he can simply extend his arm
and switch stations or flick the ‘off’ button, it is surely worth the candle to preserve the
broadcaster’s right to send, and the right of those interested to receive, a message entitled
to full First Amendment protection.”71

Secondly, Justice Brennan noted that in the past the Court had not prohibited the
distribution or access to children material otherwise protected by the First Amendment
unless such material had some significant erotic appeal.72 He cited the Court’s decision
in Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, wherein the Court held that “[s]peech that is neither obscene
as to youths nor subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely
to protect the young from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks is unsuitable for
them.”73 Justice Brennan claimed that the majority’s decision had the “lamentable” side
effect of making “completely unavailable to adults material which may not
constitutionally be kept even from children.”74 Furthermore, he opined that the Court
completely failed to take into account that some parents might actually wish to have their
children hear Carlin’s monologue, and that instead of facilitating a parent’s decisionmaking rights in child-rearing, the Court had allowed the Commission to make such
decisions for the parent.75
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Justice Brennan was particularly concerned with the two rationales used by the majority
to support the FCC’s regulation of indecency in the case: intrusiveness of the medium
and access of the material to children.76 In particular, he reasoned that without any limits,
the Commission could use the rationales as justification to regulate any material the
Commission found offensive.77 He acknowledged that the concurring opinion attempted
to avoid such an “unpalatable degree of censorship”78 by relying on the Commission’s
assurances of restraint. However, even with a holding limited to the facts of the case,
Justice Brennan stated he would still let the public and marketplace decide what was
indecent rather than rely on the Commission’s tastes.79

Noting the trust the Court placed on the Commission’s assurances, Justice Brennan
threads into his dissent a very prescient discussion regarding the FCC’s future restraint.
In its brief to the Court, the FCC assured the Court that it only desired to reprimand
broadcasters on facts similar to the Pacifica case: A 12-minute broadcast that repeated
over and over words depicting sexual or excretory activities and organs, and did so in a
patently offensive manner when children were in the audience.80 Based on these
assurances, Justice Brennan opined that the FCC should be estopped from using either the
Pacifica decision or FCC orders in the case as a basis for sanctioning broadcasters unless
the broadcast contained the type of verbal shock treatment claimed in the Carlin
76
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monologue and, even then, only if the material was broadcast at times other than the late
evening.81

Whether the limitations of the case are drawn from the majority, concurring or dissenting
opinions, two elements about the Pacifica case are clear. First, the decision was limited
to the specific facts at hand. The Supreme Court did not address a rule promulgated by
the Commission in regulating future situations. It merely concluded that given the
repeated use of the kind of words in the Carlin monologue, at a time of day when children
are likely in the audience, the Commission could act under 18 U.S.C. § 1464. Second,
because the Court acknowledged that indecent speech is protected under the First
Amendment, it relied on the Commission’s assurances that it would proceed cautiously in
its enforcement duties, thus alleviating concern that enforcement of the statute would
have an undue chilling effect on broadcasters’ speech. The following discussion
illustrates that the FCC’s record of “restraint” in indecency enforcement since Pacifica
has been questionable at best.

C. The FCC Holds Its Applause-Initial Restraint by the FCC
In the immediate aftermath of the Pacifica case, many broadcasters feared that the
decision would have a detrimental effect on their programming. The FCC quickly tried
to assuage these concerns, noting the limited nature of the holding and its own
enforcement restraint. In a message to broadcasters, FCC Chairman Charles D. Ferris
assured them that the FCC was “far more dedicated to the First Amendment premise that

81

Id.
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broadcasters should air controversial programming than [they] are worried about an
occasional four-letter word.”82 Ferris further tried to calm concerns about the reach of
the holding by stating that “the particular set of circumstances in the Pacifica case is
about as likely to occur again as Halley’s Comet.”83

Further limiting the Pacifica holding was the Commission’s own order leading to the
case, which stated that it would be inequitable for the FCC to hold a licensee responsible
for indecent language broadcast during live coverage of a news making event.84 In
addition, an FCC order issued shortly after the Pacifica case demonstrated the
narrowness with which the Commission initially viewed the holding. The order was
issued in response to a Morality in Media petition to deny a noncommercial educational
station, WGBH-TV, its license renewal claiming that the station had consistently
broadcast offensive and vulgar material harmful to children.85 The Commission granted
the station its license renewal, holding it could not deny the license simply because the
material was “offensive to some or even a substantial number of listeners.”86 According
to the Commission, it had to take into account the station’s overall programming, and
Morality in Media had not provided any evidence that the broadcasts were harmful to

82
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children. The Commission stated that it intended “strictly to observe the narrowness of
the Pacifica holding”87 reasoning that Pacifica was limited to language that was
“repeated over and over as a sort of verbal shock treatment.”88

In another instance of early FCC restraint, in 1983 the Commission denied a complaint
by the American Legal Foundation (“AFL”), which argued that a radio station’s
programming violated 18 U.S.C. § 1464 by airing indecent material.89 The AFL claimed
that the station aired words such as “motherfucker” and “shit” repetitively on its
programs.90 However, the Commission held that the AFL failed to make a case that the
station violated the indecency statute and noted that the complaint showed only isolated
use of the alleged language over a three-year license term. As such, the use of the words,
although similar to those addressed in the Pacifica case, did not “amount to the
repetitious ‘verbal shock treatment’”91 found in Carlin’s monologue. In particular, the
Commission noted that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Pacifica did not give the
Commission the “general prerogative”92 to intervene in any case where words similar to
those in Pacifica were used. The Commission again noted that the Supreme Court relied

87
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on the repetitive nature of the Carlin monologue in affirming the Commission’s ruling in
that case.93

There is little question that, at least for a brief period of time after the Pacifica decision,
the Commission adhered to the limited holding the Supreme Court rendered in the case.
Of course, Justice Brennan was correct to note that the Court had laid its trust entirely
with the FCC to ensure it did not go beyond the confines of the decision, since the Court
did not make much of an attempt to fashion a definition for use in the future, only noting
that the particular broadcast at issue could be sanctioned. However, the FCC’s initial
restraint did not last.

II. The Other Actors Take Their Place - Congress, Advocacy Groups and the D.C.
Circuit Address Indecency
A. Congress, Advocacy Groups and the FCC
During the 1980s, Congress and the Commission began to see an increase in pressure
from advocacy groups angered by what they perceived as the FCC’s failure to enforce the
indecency statute. These groups were concerned that, so long as the broadcasters did not
invoke one of Carlin’s seven dirty words, the Commission was allowing broadcasters to
air offensive and vulgar material. Based at least in part on this pressure and increased
Congressional concern, the FCC changed course on its enforcement policy, taking its first
of several steps in expanding the Pacifica holding and its enforcement power.
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Some of the initial pressure came from various advocacy groups. In June of 1986,
Morality in Media (“MIM”) organized a picket of FCC offices after President Reagan
reappointed Mark Fowler as chairman of the FCC.94 Mr. Fowler’s nomination was
resented by various “decency in media” groups because, in their opinion, he hadn’t done
enough about indecency.95 In addition to the picketing, the groups also undertook a letter
writing campaign to protest his nomination.96

In an apparent attempt at damage control, Mr. Fowler met with Brad Curl, a member of
the National Decency Forum in July 1986.97 Based on a letter summarizing their
meeting, Mr. Curl advised Mr. Fowler that his group would discontinue picketing the
FCC office.98 Further, Mr. Curl noted his understanding that the FCC General Counsel
would cooperate with Mr. Curl’s group on indecency investigations in the future.99 Mr.
Curl also acknowledged the FCC’s belief that it had not received enough complaints in
the past to act on the indecency issue, and that, in response, Mr. Curl’s group would
endeavor to submit more and better documented complaints.100
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FCC’s General Counsel at this time, Jack Smith, apparently followed through on the
parties’ understanding from the meeting. Around the time of the meeting, MIM began
forwarding pointers received from Mr. Smith advising MIM members to make tapes or
transcripts of the broadcasts they found offensive in order to facilitate action on the
complaints.101 Mr. Smith also directed such advocacy groups away from broadcasts that
were unlikely to result in a finding of indecency. In one letter to Donald Wildmon,
Executive Director of the National Federation of Decency, Mr. Smith warned against
pursuing a complaint for the broadcast of the film The Rose on a Memphis television
station. In this letter, Mr. Smith advised “‘as we discussed on the phone today I do not
believe this presents the kind of air-tight case that you want to push at this time. We are
inquiring into a couple of other cases which we think may be more clear violations. I
think you should agree with our reasoning on this matter.’”102

Given this backdrop, it is not surprising that complaints filed by Mr. Wildmon against an
Infinity-owned radio station in September and November of 1986103 led to one of the
“air-tight” test cases that Mr. Smith referenced in his letter. The Infinity case, along with
two others,104 would prove to be the opportunity the FCC was looking for to expand its
enforcement policy beyond the confines of the Pacifica facts and to greatly expand its
discretion in determining the meaning of indecency. There is little question that this push
101
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to broaden the indecency net would not have taken place without these advocacy groups’
tenacious pursuit of the FCC.

B. FCC April 1987 Orders
The FCC issued three separate orders in April 1987 against a university-run station in
California,105 an Infinity-owned station in Philadelphia,106 and a Pacifica-owned station in
Los Angeles,107 holding that the stations had broadcast indecent material. The
Commission issued no fines as a result of the orders, acknowledging that the orders
expanded its previously limited enforcement of the indecency statute. Specifically, in the
orders the Commission determined that it would no longer limit what it considered
indecent to a broadcaster’s repeated use of one of Carlin’s seven dirty words.

The FCC laid out most of the reasoning for its policy change in its 1987 Pacifica order.
In response to the complaint, Pacifica argued to the Commission that the material in
question did not allow for a finding of indecency under 18 USC § 1464, because the
Supreme Court’s holding in Pacifica limited the finding of indecency to “deliberate,
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repetitive use of the seven words actually contained in the George Carlin monologue.”108
In response, the Commission stated that “[w]hile Commission action subsequent to the
Pacifica decision may have indicated this to be the Commission’s position,we take this
opportunity to state that, notwithstanding any prior contrary indications, we will not
apply the Pacifica standard so narrowly in the future.”109

According to the Commission, the definition of indecent material set out in the Pacifica
case included more than just the words used in the Carlin monologue. The FCC argued
that the words used in the Carlin monologue were “more correctly treated as examples of,
rather than a definite list of, the kinds of words that, when used in a patently offensive
manner as measured by contemporary community standards applicable to the broadcast
medium, constitute indecency.”110 The Commission acknowledged that the Pacifica
holding still required complaints focusing solely on the use of the expletives to show
“deliberate and repetitive” use of such language in a patently offensive manner.111
However, the FCC stated that if the complaint went beyond the use of expletives,
repetition was not a necessary element to the determination of indecency.112 In fact, it
ruled that context must be considered if the speech involves description or depiction of
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sexual or excretory functions to determine whether the material is patently offensive
under contemporary community standards.113

The Commission also reversed course on its prior position that indecent material could be
broadcast if aired after 10:00 p.m. and preceded by a warning.114 In making the change,
the Commission determined that current evidence on the presence of children in the
listening audience after 10:00 p.m. warranted a reexamination of this past position.
Based on an audience survey of the Los Angeles metropolitan area which found that
approximately 112,000 12-17 year olds were still in the general listening audience
between 7:00 p.m. and midnight on Sundays, the Commission determined that “relying
on a specific time for broadcasting indecent material no longer satisfies the requirement
that indecent material be channeled to a time when there is not a reasonable risk that
children may be present in the broadcast audience.”115 The FCC made this finding even
in light of the Arbitron ratings provided by Pacifica which confirmed that Pacifica’s
KPFK’s listening audience rarely consisted of children.116

In holding that all three stations had broadcast indecent material as determined under the
Commission’s “new” standards, the Commission did not impose any forfeiture sanctions.
Because the orders constituted a change to its prior enforcement habits, the Commission
limited its action to warning the stations and all other broadcasters that the material
113
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would be actionable under the indecency standards as clarified in the orders. Nowhere in
the decision did the Commission explain why the standards previously used were
insufficient.

Along with the April 1987 decisions, the Commission released a general Public Notice
setting forth the new standards for regulating broadcast indecency.117 In response to the
Public Notice, several groups petitioned the Commission for a clarification or
reconsideration of the orders. The petitioners specifically requested the Commission to:
(1) provide a precise guideline to determine what material would be considered patently
offensive; (2) consider the artistic merit of a broadcast in judging whether it is indecent;
(3) exempt news and informational programming from any indecency ruling; and (4)
adopt a fixed time of day, after which indecent material could be broadcast without fear
of sanction.118

The Commission declined to do much of what the petitioners requested. With regard to
what constituted patent offensiveness, the Commission noted that context is of the utmost
importance, but declined to provide a comprehensive index or thesaurus of indecent
words or pictoral depictions it would consider patently offensive.119 According to the
Commission, several variables would be considered in the determination of indecent
material, including (1) whether the use was vulgar or shocking, (2) whether the use was
117
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isolated or fleeting, (3) the ability of the medium to separate adults from children, (4)
whether children were in the audience, and (5) the merit of the work.120 However, none
of the factors would be dispositive, nor would a finding that the material had merit render
the material not indecent per se.121 The Commission was now affording itself wide
discretion to determine what would be considered indecent. Even though it
acknowledged its previous enforcement standard was clearly easier, both for the
Commission and broadcasters, the Commission argued that it could lead to unjustifiable
anomalous results.122 The Commission did not, however, provide any examples of these
so-called anomalous results.

Although the Commission did not clarify much for the petitioners, it did set forth a new
guideline for the time of day after which indecent material could be broadcast.

The

Commission now believed a reasonable risk existed that children may be in the audience
at 10:00 p.m.123 Therefore, the Commission noted its “current thinking” was that
midnight was late enough “to ensure that the risk of children in the audience is minimized
and to rely on parents to exercise increased supervision…”124

Looking back at the Supreme Court’s decision in Pacifica, it is apparent that Justices
Powell and Blackmun relied too heavily on the Commission’s future restraint. The
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concurrence specifically stated “since the Commission may be expected to proceed
cautiously, as it has in the past…I do not foresee an undue ‘chilling’ effect on
broadcasters’ exercise of their rights.”125 Justices Brennan and Marshall were better
prognosticators when they noted in their dissent, “I am far less certain than my Brother
Powell that…faith in the Commission…is warranted…and even if I shared it, I could not
so easily shirk the responsibility assumed by each Member of this Court jealously to
guard against encroachments on First Amendment freedoms.”126

C. The D.C. Circuit Steps into the ACT
Several groups challenged the Commission’s new enforcement policy in Action for
Children’s Television v. F.C.C.127 (“ACT I”) filed in the D.C. Circuit. The petitioners
claimed that the Commission’s generic definition of indecency was unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad, and that the Commission’s decision to change the time after which
indecent material could be broadcast from 10:00 p.m. to midnight was arbitrary and
capricious.128

Initially, the D.C. Circuit rejected the Commission’s position that it should consider the
indecency definition only with respect to the specific facts in the April 1987 orders, i.e.,
whether the material in those cases were indecent as broadcast. The court quickly noted
that the facts at hand presented a much different situation than that confronting the
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Supreme Court in Pacifica. According to the court, the Commission had clearly engaged
in a form of rulemaking through its April 1987 orders, its Public Notice, and the
Reconsideration Memorandum and Opinion.129 Contrary to the Commission’s position in
Pacifica, the Commission this time intended to apply the new enforcement standards to
all broadcasts on a prospective basis.

Addressing the petitioners’ claim of vagueness, the court concluded it did not have the
authority to address the question on its merits. According to the D.C. Circuit, since the
Supreme Court in its Pacifica opinion quoted the FCC’s generic definition with “seeming
approval” then implicit within the Supreme Court’s decision was the determination that
the definition was not inherently vague.130 Interestingly, the D.C. Circuit explicitly stated
in its opinion that if in reaching that conclusion it had “misunderstood Higher Authority,”
it welcomed correction from such Higher Authority (i.e., the Supreme Court).131 The
D.C. Circuit’s holding on this issue is curious, given that the Supreme Court in Pacifica
had specifically limited its holding and the reach of the decision to the specific facts of
the case. The Supreme Court explicitly declined to address whether the definition used
by the Commission in Pacifica would be upheld in future situations. In fact, the Supreme
Court never addressed whether the indecency definition used by the FCC was vague, but
instead considered whether to interpret the word indecent in the statute to require a
finding of obscenity.132
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The D.C. Circuit considered the overbreadth challenge on its merits. One argument
presented by the petitioners was that the FCC could not deem material indecent unless the
work taken as a whole lacked serious merit. Because social value entitles otherwise
obscene material protection under the Millerstandard,

133

the petitioners argued at the

very least, the same should hold true for arguable indecent material.134 The FCC
countered that it did take into consideration merit in determining whether material is
indecent; however it would not consider it a dispositive factor.135

In the end, the court agreed with the FCC, noting that although the new enforcement
standards would invade protected freedoms of adults, the power of the state to control the
conduct of children reached beyond the scope of its authority over adults.136 As support,
the court cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Ginsberg v. New York,137 which upheld a
state statute prohibiting the distribution of non-obscene, but sexually explicit materials to
children. Of course, one key difference between Ginsberg and the broadcast indecency
arena is that limiting the sale of such materials in Ginsberg did not affect the ability of
adults to obtain the materials. That is certainly not the case if broadcasters are forced to
alter programming to avoid indecency sanctions.
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Unfortunately, the D.C. Circuit made the same mistake as the concurring Justices did in
Pacifica. In a footnote on the overbreadth issue, the D.C. Circuit noted that although it
would not completely defer to the FCC’s judgment on what is indecent, the FCC had
assured the court it would continue to give weight to reasonable licensee judgments when
deciding to impose sanctions in a particular case.138 Because of this “assurance” the
court concluded that the chilling effect of the indecency definition would be “tempered
by the Commission’s restrained enforcement policy.”139 Given that no indecency fines
were imposed on broadcasters from 1978 to 1987, the court most likely felt safe in
relying on the Commission’s purported restraint. This is an extraordinary amount of trust
to place in five commissioners selected by the President, confirmed by the Senate and
funded by Congress.

The last issue confronted by the D.C. Circuit was the newly-issued safe harbor hours,
altering the times when broadcasters could air indecent material. Reasoning that the
Commission is an agency, the court held that the FCC must articulate a rational
connection between the facts found and the choices made.140 According to the court, the
Commission failed to do this. Reasoning that broadcasters were now faced with a less
than precise definition of indecency, the court concluded that a failure to provide a
clearly defined safe harbor would surely lead broadcasters to avoid such programming
altogether.141 Based on its safe harbor analysis, the court vacated in part the FCC’s
138
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reconsideration order and returned the Pacifica and Regents of the University of
California decisions to the Commission for redetermination, since the broadcasts at issue
in those cases were aired after 10:00 p.m.

It is noteworthy that the court upheld the generic definition of indecency without
requiring the Commission to demonstrate a need for the new enforcement standards. In
remanding the safe harbor hours issue, the D.C. Circuit required the Commission to
articulate a rational connection between the facts found and the choices made. However,
the D.C. Circuit did not require the Commission to do the same for this very important
change in its enforcement policy. The Commission never provided any evidence of the
anomalous results it cited as the reason for the policy change.

Two months after the ACT I decision, Congress stepped into the fray by passing the
Helms amendment, signed by President Bush on October 1, 1988, which required the
FCC to enforce the indecency prohibition in 18 U.S.C. § 1464 on a 24-hour basis, starting
January 31, 1989.142 Before introducing the bill, Senator Jesse Helms sought advice
from the Heritage Foundation and the former General Counsel of the FCC on the
constitutionality of such a 24-hour prohibition.143 Helms was advised that although the
bill itself was constitutionally uncertain, strong congressional custom was to enact such
an uncertain law if it promoted sound public policy.144
142
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The question of the amendment’s constitutionally was decided by the D.C. Circuit in
Action for Children’s Television v. F.C.C.145 (ACT II). The court, relying on its initial
ACT I decision, concluded that the Commission must afford some reasonable period of
time for the broadcasting of indecent material.146 As such, neither the Commission nor
Congress could completely ban the broadcasting of indecent material, since it is protected
First Amendment speech. Acknowledging that while Congress’ “apparent belief that a
total ban on broadcast indecency is constitutional, it is ultimately the judiciary’s task,
particularly in the First Amendment context, to decide whether Congress has violated the
Constitution.”147 With the 24-hour ban, the court held Congress had violated
broadcasters’ First Amendment rights.

The current status of the safe harbor hours was finally determined in the 1995 case of
Action for Children’s Television v. F.C.C.148 (ACT III). In this case, the D.C. Circuit
considered whether Section 16(a) of the Public Telecommunications Act of 1992 was
constitutional. The provision provided that indecent materials could only be broadcast
between the hours of midnight and 6:00 a.m.149 However, the Act made an exception for
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public radio and television stations that go off the air at or before midnight, allowing such
stations to broadcast indecent materials after 10:00 p.m., instead of midnight.150

The petitioners in ACT III argued the provision violated their First Amendment rights
because it imposed restrictions on indecent broadcasts without being narrowly tailored to
the purported compelling government interest.151 The court rejected this argument;
although the court agreed that such a strict scrutiny analysis was the appropriate standard
to use in determining whether the Commission and Congress had appropriately regulated
indecent speech, because it is protected by the First Amendment.152 However, the court
noted that based on Pacifica, the analysis under the strict scrutiny test was more
deferential than for other forms of media.153 According to the court, two of the
government’s proffered reasons for regulating indecent speech were compelling:
assisting parent’s supervision of their children’s exposure to broadcasting and protecting
children’s psychological health.154

The court then turned to whether the regulation employed the least restrictive means
necessary to accomplish the compelling government interest. Reasoning that fewer
children watch television and listen to the radio between midnight and 6:00 a.m. than
during the day, and that many adults tune in at such hours, the regulation was, in the
150
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court’s opinion, narrowly tailored.155 However, because Section 16(a) provided an
exemption from the midnight to 6:00 a.m. safe harbor for public stations that go off the
air at or before midnight, the court concluded that the section affected disparate treatment
amongst broadcasters. According to the court, Congress did not explain how this
disparate treatment advanced its goal of protecting children, and therefore, the court set
aside the more restrictive midnight to 6:00 a.m. safe harbor and remanded the case to the
Commission with instructions to limit its ban to the hours of 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m.156

The series of ACT decisions were a blow to many First Amendment proponents. While
the Supreme Court had limited its holding in Pacifica to the facts of the case, the D.C.
Circuit in ACT I considered the definition of indecency as it might be applied in future
situations. Unfortunately, the court refused to consider the petitioners’ argument that the
indecency definition was unconstitutionally vague, based on its belief the Supreme Court
in Pacifica had cited the FCC definition with seeming approval. Just as disheartening
was the D.C. Circuit’s reliance on the FCC’s purported restraint in enforcing its
newfound power as the linchpin of its decision that the indecency definition was not
unconstitutionally overbroad.

Notwithstanding these disappointments, it is still important to note that the ACT decisions
did not give the Commission cart blanche. For one thing, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged
that any restriction on indecent speech is content based and therefore subject to a strict
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scrutiny analysis by the courts. Although the court noted more deference would be given
to such restrictions in the broadcast medium than in other mediums, it still required that
any restrictions on indecent speech be narrowly tailored to support a compelling
government interest.

Furthermore, the court again relied on the Commission’s purported enforcement restraint
in ruling that the definition used was not unconstitutionally overbroad. In doing so, the
court necessarily relied on the FCC’s statement that it would still require repetitive use of
expletives for a finding of indecency.157 Given the FCC’s fairly restrained history of
enforcement at the time of the ACT I decision,158 the court’s reliance on the FCC’s
assurance may have seemed reasonable. Once again, however, the Commission took the
inch and turned it into a mile.

III.

The FCC and Congress Take Center Stage
A. FCC Enforcement and the 2001 Policy Statement

While the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit relied on the Commission’s promised
enforcement restraint in Pacifica and the ACT cases, broadcasters could not do the same.
Based on the number of indecency fines issued since Pacifica until 1997, it appears that
the vigor with which indecency actions were pursued fluctuated, forcing broadcasters to
guess from year to year when the next crack down on enforcement would come and
pondering what the commissioners that year would consider indecent.

157

Pacifica Found., 2 FCC Rcd, at 2703.

158

No indecency fines were issued between 1978 and 1987. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.

37

As previously noted, from Pacifica until the FCC’s April 1987 orders, indecency
sanctions by the Commission were nonexistent.159 In fact, no indecency fines were
issued by the Commission between 1978 and 1987.160 From 1987 until 1997 the
Commission issued thirty-six indecency fines.161 Thirty-one of those thirty-six fines were
issued between 1989 and 1994, during the bulk of Commissioner Chair Alfred Sikes’
tenure.162 Chairman Sikes’ helm at the Commission, however, may have been affected
by Congressional concern over indecency.

Between 1985 and 1987 not a single FCC nominee was asked about his or her stance on
indecency.163 However, during three nomination hearings in 1989, including Chairman
Sikes’ hearing, the nominees were asked what they proposed to do about the indecency
problem.164 Perhaps this interest from Congress explains the increased number of fines
issued between 1989 and 1994. Congress perceived indecency to be a problem,
therefore, the Commission perceived indecency to be a problem. Chairman Sikes himself
made it clear that enforcement of the indecency statute would be a prominent feature of
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his term.165 The Commission’s indecency enforcement, however, slowed after 1994, due
in part to the fact that the new FCC Chair, Reed Hundt, came to the Commission with a
focus on children’s programming as opposed to indecency policing.166

In addition to facing the FCC’s changing enforcement habits over the years, broadcasters
also had to make programming decisions in light of the amorphous indecency definition
approved by the D.C. Circuit in ACT I. In 1994, however, it appeared that broadcasters
might get some assistance in understanding the Commission’s application of the
definition when, pursuant to a settlement with Evergreen Media Corporation, the
Commission agreed to issue guidelines regarding the Commission’s indecency orders.167
The guidelines were supposed to be released within 90 days of the February 22, 1994
settlement;168 however, broadcasters would not see the actual policy statement until April
6, 2001. Even seven years later, it still provided little actual guidance.

According to the FCC’s 2001 Policy Statement169 (“Guidelines”), an indecency finding
requires two determinations. First, the material must describe or depict sexual or
excretory organs or activities.170 Second, the broadcast must be patently offensive as
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measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium.171 The
Guidelines provide that community standards are measured by the average broadcast
viewer or listener, without regard for a particular region or area of the country.172

In making an indecency finding, the Guidelines note that context is “critically
important.”173 Even if explicit language is used, that is not the end of the analysis, nor is
the fact that the broadcast refrains from using explicit language. Illustrating the
importance of context the Guidelines state that “[e]xplicit language in the context of a
bona fide newscast might not be patently offensive, while sexual innuendo that persists
and is sufficiently clear to make the sexual meaning inescapable might be.”174

Also set forth is the following list of “principal factors” the Commission relies upon in
making a determination of indecency: “1) the explicitness or graphic nature of the
description or depiction of sexual or excretory organs or activities; (2) whether the
material dwells on or repeats at length descriptions or sexual or excretory organs or
activities; (3) whether the material appears to pander or is used to titillate, or whether
the material appears to have been presented for its shock value.”175 Here again, the

171

Id. at ¶ 8.

172

Id.

173

Id. at ¶ 9.

174

Id.

175

Id. at ¶ 10.

40

overall context is crucial and no single factor “generally provides the basis for an
indecency finding.”176

The Guidelines provide 31 case examples meant to help broadcasters determine what
kind of material the Commission would consider indecent. Unfortunately, the
Commission took great pains to note that the examples were only “intended as a research
tool and should not be taken as a meaningful selection of words and phrases to be
evaluated for indecency purposes without the fuller context that the tapes or transcripts
provide.”177 So, from the outset, the examples provide little guidance to broadcasters
trying to steer clear of the Commission’s wide net.

Of the examples, only four were television broadcasts, and all four were found not to
have aired indecent material. Of the 28 radio broadcast examples, all but 5 were found to
have aired indecent material. For broadcasters hoping to find clarification on what the
Commission would deem indecent, the examples were not particularly instructive. For
instance, in one example, the Commission found a broadcast of the Howard Stern show
indecent for snippets from Stern such as “God, my testicles are like down to the
floor…you could really have a party with these…Use them like Bocci balls.”178
However, a radio station broadcast in South Carolina of “[t]he hell I did, I drove the
mother-fucker, oh.” was found not indecent.179
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Because the Commission cautioned against any broadcaster’s definitive reliance on the
examples, their usefulness was severely limited. In addition, although the Guidelines
outlined three factors the Commission would consider in determining whether material
was indecent, the failure of the material to meet one or even all of the factors would still
not preclude an indecency finding. Examining each factor, it is clear the Commission
must inevitably engage in a highly subjective analysis, and in doing so substitutes the
commissioners’ opinions and tastes for that of “contemporary community standards for
the broadcast medium.” Whether five commissioners can be relied upon to effectively
gauge what constitutes contemporary community standards is a crucial question in
examining FCC enforcement policy. A recent survey seems to indicate the
commissioners have a serious disconnect with much of the broadcasting community they
claim to represent.

In March of 2004, Edison Media Research and Jacobs Media polled almost 14,000
listeners of over 40 alternative rock, classic rock, and alternative music radio stations to
gauge their views of indecency over the airwaves.180 The survey posed a series of
questions, one of which asked whether their morning radio programs offended
respondents.181 Only 2% of the respondents said they were offended frequently, 9.2%
said sometimes, 34.2% said rarely and over half, 54.6% said they were never offended by
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their radio programs.182 Eighty percent of the listeners responded that people who want
to listen to Howard Stern on the radio should be able to do so, and nearly 81% agreed that
even if a small group of listeners is offended by a radio show’s content, the FCC should
not take action against it.183 From the results of the survey, it appears the Commission
and listeners of “rock” music stations have a very different view of what might be
considered patently offensive. Given that the question of whether material is patently
offensive is one of the linchpins to a finding of indecency, this disconnect is crucial in
indecency sanctions.

From the Commission’s fluctuating vigor in pursuing complaints and designating
material as indecent to its failure to provide real guidance in its 2001 Policy Statement,
broadcasters were left guessing after the FCC’s April 1987 orders. Unfortunately, just
when it seemed the regulatory picture could not get any worse for broadcasters, Bono
dropped the F-bomb, Janet flashed some flesh, and the indecency net was cast wider once
again.

B. The Golden Globe Awards Decision and Recent Congressional and FCC
Action
Given the subjective nature of the Commission’s indecency analysis, it is not surprising
that the Commission cannot even remain consistent with its previously announced
policies or decisions. A good example of this inconsistency is the Commission’s March
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18, 2004 decision regarding U-2’s lead singer, Bono, and his acceptance speech at the
2003 Golden Globe Awards show.

During a Golden Globe Awards program on January 19, 2003, Bono, in accepting an
award for “Best Original Song”, said “[t]his is really, really, fucking brilliant. Really,
really great.”184 The FCC received 234 complaints regarding the broadcast, 217 of which
were filed by individuals associated with Parents Television Council.185

In October 2003, the FCC’s Enforcement Bureau (the first stop on a complaint’s process
through the FCC) issued a decision denying the complaint.186 The decision reasoned that
the Commission’s role in overseeing program content was limited and that any action
taken against indecent programming must take into account that indecent speech is
protected under the First Amendment.187 With respect to the specific material broadcast,
the Bureau noted that even as a “threshold matter” the material aired did not describe or
depict sexual or excretory activities or functions because the word was used as an
adjective or expletive for emphasis.188 Citing its own 2001 Policy Statement, the Bureau
explained that in similar circumstances it had found offensive language used as an insult
as opposed to a description of sexual or excretory functions or activities was not within
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its scope of prohibiting indecent material.189 In addition, the Bureau pointed out that the
use was isolated and fleeting, and again based on past decisions was not actionable.190

As with the Congressional activity in the late 80s, Congress, unhappy with the Bureau’s
decision, acted by jumping into the fray. Both houses of Congress passed resolutions
shortly after the Bureau’s decision pushing for the Commission’s full review and
reversal.191 This Congressional push, coupled with the fallout from the Janet
Jackson/Justin Timberlake Super Bowl half-time show, during which Ms. Jackson’s
breast was briefly exposed, prompted the full Commission to act on March 18, 2004,
reversing its own Enforcement Bureau. In doing so, the Commission contradicted both
its 2001 Policy Statement and previous Commission decisions.

The Commission’s order acknowledged that the use of the word by Bono was as an
exemplifier.192 Nonetheless, the Commission concluded that the core meaning of the “FWord” had a sexual connotation, and therefore, described sexual activities and met the
first prong requirement of an indecency finding.193 The Commission next considered
whether the broadcast was patently offensive. Claiming that the “F-Word” is “one of the
most vulgar, graphic and explicit descriptions of sexual activity in the English language,”
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the Commission quickly determined the use was patently offensive. According to the
opinion, the use was “shocking and gratuitous,” and the fact that the use was
unintentional was irrelevant.194

Confronting its obviously contrary precedent on the isolated and fleeting nature of the
use, the Commission stated that “while prior Commission and staff action have indicated
that isolated or fleeting broadcasts of the ‘F-Word’ such as that here are not indecent or
would not be acted upon, consistent with our decision today, we conclude that any such
interpretation is no longer good law.”195 In particular, the Commission had to repudiate
its own words in its April 1987 Pacifica order that prompted the ACT I case. In that
order, the Commission stated that if a complaint focused “solely on the use of expletives,
we believe that . . . deliberate and repetitive use in a patently offensive manner is a
requisite to a finding of indecency.”196 The Commission held that it now departed from
that portion of its 1987 Pacifica decision, and any other cases where the Commission had
held that the isolated or fleeting use of the “F-Word” in situations similar to the Bono
case would not be considered indecent.197

Not content with holding the broadcast indecent, the Commission also determined that
Bono’s use of the “F-Word” was “profane” under 18 U.S.C. § 1464, a contention not
even made by the Parents Television Council, the group which launched the appeal to the
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full Commission.198 The Commission found that although its previous precedent only
focused on profanity under the statute in the context of blasphemy, “[b]roadcasters are on
notice that the Commission in the future will not limit its definition of profane speech to
only those words and phrases that contain an element of blasphemy or divine
imprecation, but, depending on the context, will also consider under the definition of
‘profanity’ the ‘F-Word’ and those words (or variants thereof) that are as highly offensive
as the ‘F-Word’….”199

The Commission’s departure from precedent and distancing from its 2001 Policy
Statement exemplifies the problem inherent upon any court’s reliance on Commission
restraint in protecting broadcasters’ First Amendment rights. As detailed throughout this
article, the Commission proclaims to the courts that it will be circumspect in its
enforcement of the indecency statute, thus allowing the courts the ability to claim that
enforcement will not unduly chill protected First Amendment speech. However, each
time the courts have relied upon such FCC guarantees, the FCC, prompted by a host of
political and social factors, has switched strategies and expanded its enforcement power.
Each time, the Commission has done so relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Pacifica.

In fact, the Commission’s decision in the Bono case claimed that its decision was not
inconsistent with Pacifica, because the Supreme Court had explicitly left the door open as
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to whether the occasional utterance of an expletive would be considered indecent.200 In
making this claim, the Commission cites the majority opinion, but specifically sets forth a
portion of the concurring opinion.201 But the portion of the concurring opinion to which
the Commission cites was specifically attempting to note the limited manner of the
Court’s holding and the restraint with which the Commission had assured the Court it
would act in the future.202 There is quite a bit of irony in the fact that the Commission
now uses the passage intended to limit the Court’s holding and thus the Commission’s
authority, in an effort to expand its reach.

The Commission’s Golden Globe decision came amidst a call for increased regulation of
indecency from Congress after the infamous Super Bowl halftime show featuring Janet
Jackson and Justin Timberlake. In the wake of this event, each chamber of Congress
passed its own version of a bill purporting to crack down on indecent speech. A House
Bill passed on March 11, 2004 would increase the amount a broadcaster can be fined for
each indecency violation from $27,500 to $500,000.203 In addition, the bill provides that
the Commission can begin licensee revocation proceedings against a broadcaster with
three or more indecency violation findings on its record during any term of its license.204
On June 22, 2004, the Senate passed portions of a bill originally introduced in January as
200
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part of a defense bill.205 The provisions included in the bill would increase fines for
broadcasters from $27,500 to $275,000 per incident, and for personalities from $11,000
to $275,000 per incident; the fines would increase for each incident until reaching the
maximum of $3,000,000 a day.206 In addition, the provisions added would delay for one
year the FCC’s media ownership rules passed in 2003.207

While this recent flurry of activity indicates an ever-increasing willingness by the
Commission and Congress to expand the Commission’s enforcement authority, it appears
that the increased vigor towards indecency enforcement actually began back in 2001, at
the outset of Commission Chairman Michael Powell’s tenure. Since Chairman Powell
took office in mid-January 2001, the FCC has issued 18 proposed indecency forfeitures
for a total of $1.4 million in proposed fines.208 That amount exceeds the total amount of
about $850,000 in indecency forfeitures proposed during the prior seven years under two
previous Commissions.209 In fact, as of April 19, 2004, the FCC had proposed more fines
for broadcast indecency in 2004 alone than the previous 10 years combined.210
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Under Chairman Powell, the Commission has increased the base amount of the typical
fine for indecency violations from $7,000 to the statutory maximum of $27,500 per
incident.211 Further, the Commission has notified broadcasters that it may begin license
revocation proceedings for “serious” indecency violations,212 but has not notified
broadcasters what it will consider “serious” violations. The Commission has also
informed broadcasters that it may treat multiple utterances within a single program as
constituting multiple indecency violations, rather than following its traditional per
program approach.213 The Commission’s indecency investigations have also been
expanded to cover not only the broadcast station that is the subject of a particular
complaint, but also to cover co-owned stations, regardless of whether any complaint was
even received about a co-owned station.214

By all accounts, the Commission’s lack of restraint in enforcing the indecency statute has
had a real and substantial effect on broadcasters’ programming. A week after the Super
Bowl show, NBC decided to pull a scene from an ER episode showing an 80-year old
woman’s breast while she received medical care.215 ABC decided to darken a sex scene
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on an episode of NYPD Blue, a show that has been airing such fare for a decade.216
Beyond television, radio programmers are now pulling or editing long-aired songs such
as Pink Floyd’s “Money”, Steve Miller Band’s “Jet Airliner”, The Who’s “Who Are
You?”, and Pearl Jam’s “Jeremy,” due to infrequent and in some instances isolated use of
expletives.217 Clear Channel fired disk jocky Todd Clem, the host of Bubba the Love
Sponge and permanently pulled Howard Stern from six markets.218 The recent indecency
crackdown led one radio insider to claim “[i]t’s as if someone turned the thermostat down
20 degrees. It’s had a very chilling effect.”219

Even PBS has not been untouched by the “chilling effect”. The producers of a PBS
documentary on Emma Goldman agreed to cut a couple of seconds out of a love scene for
fear of showing too much cleavage.220 Ironically, Emma Goldman was a 20th century
anarchist and advocate of free speech. An independently produced film to be aired on
PBS about activist/author Piri Thomas also recently came under fire. The film included
the author reading excerpts from his novel “Down These Mean Streets” about his coming
of age in the 30s, 40s and 50s.221 Based on the FCC’s Golden Globe decision, PBS was
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forced to edit out of the film words like “fuck” and “shit,” and some PBS affiliates
requested words such as “piss”, “nigger” and “spic” be removed.222 Nebraska Public
Television pulled the show completely from its line up.223

The recent activity by Congress and the Commission shows no signs of slowing anytime
soon. Unlike commissioner statements immediately after Pacifica, attempting to assure
broadcasters that the Commission was still more interested in robust programming rather
than the occasional expletive, members of the current Commission declare that it will use
all ammunition in its armory and put to use any additional quivers in its arrows that
Congress may give it to enforce the indecency statute. The effect of such vigorous
pursuit of so-called indecency ranges from PBS’ deletion of obscenities spoken by Iraqi
soldiers in a Frontline program to an increasing lack of live programming in favor of
tape-delayed broadcasts.224 The overall effect is that today, broadcasters are increasingly
likely to adopt the philosophy of “when in doubt, leave it out.”225

Conclusion
The indecency doctrine began simply enough. The Supreme Court’s Pacifica decision
upheld the FCC’s finding of indecency for material that repeated certain expletives 108
times during a 12-minute monologue. What has grown out of that limited holding,
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however, has become quite unwieldy. From its original enforcement standard of
sanctioning broadcasters for repetitive use of one of Carlin’s seven dirty words, to the
expansion of regulation to double entendre and innuendo, to an indecency finding for the
utterance of just one expletive in the midst of a live event, the FCC has moved well
beyond Pacifica. In doing so, it has taken upon itself the mantle of arbiter of what the
average viewer finds patently offensive, inevitably substituting its own judgment of what
is “shocking or vulgar” or whether the material “panders or titillates”. The difficulty in
allowing a governmental body to judge speech that is protected by the First Amendment
is probably best illustrated by Justice Harlan’s admonition that “it is nevertheless often
true that one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.”226
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